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Ambrose Burnside, the Ninth Army Corps, and the 
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House 
 
Ryan T. Quint 
 
Spring had come and that meant that the 
bloodletting could begin anew. For Major General 
Ambrose Everett Burnside that campaign commenced on 
April 13, 1864 when he arrived in Annapolis, Maryland to 
rendezvous with his Ninth Army Corps.1 Around the city 
that was home to the U.S. Naval Academy the soldiers in 
the corps’ three divisions milled about, drilling and 
organizing. Most of the men in the divisions were brand 
new recruits, learning the school of the soldier for the first 
time. These recruits were shuffled into regiments shrunken 
by years of arduous fighting for the Union all the way from 
the North Carolina Coast in the spring of 1862 to, most 
recently, the Siege of Knoxville.2 
 The same day that Burnside arrived in Annapolis he 
paraded the Ninth Corps in review for recently-promoted 
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant.3 As general-in-chief 
                                                          
1 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1991), 345.  
2 Augustus Woodbury, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and the 
Ninth Army Corps: A Narrative of Campaigns (Providence: Sidney S. 
Rider & Brother, 1867), 365, 367; William F. Fox, Regimental Losses 
in the American Civil War (Albany: Albany Publishing Company, 
1889), 81-83.  
3 A word on the convention of writing out Federal corps is useful here. 
Though the practice of identifying Federal corps with Roman numerals 
is the accepted practice today, during the war the corps were identified 
with either regular numbers or were spelled out. I also agree with the 
late Harry Pfanz, who wrote that “[F]or me…Roman numerals always 
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of the United States Army, it was expected that he would 
have set up his headquarters in the nation’s capital, but 
Grant decided to take the field. Grant found the Ninth 
Corps in “an admirable position for such a reinforcement.” 
From its location Burnside’s men “could be brought at the 
last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the 
Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of 
Norfolk, in Virginia, or North Carolina, to operate against 
Richmond from that direction.” Though Grant had 
witnessed these soldiers pass in review this was hardly the 
reason he had come all the way to Annapolis from his field 
headquarters near Culpeper; rather it was to “confer with 
Burnside about the role the Ninth Corps would play in the 
spring campaign….”4 
 That role, Burnside soon found out, was to support 
the Army of the Potomac with an overland march. On April 
23 the Ninth Corps packed up its tents and formed into 
marching columns. To the surprise of many of the soldiers, 
the corps began to march towards Washington, D.C., not 
down to the Annapolis docks. It had made its fame on a 
naval expedition against North Carolina’s Outer Banks in 
1862 and still had the legacy to prove it: its insignia was an 
anchor and cannon, crossed over a shield. Many expected 
to repeat their success at sea with another strike at a rebel 
                                                                                                                    
require a pause for translation that snags my train of thought.” Harry 
W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987), xvii.  
4 Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (New York: Literary 
Classics of the United States, 1990 reprint), 477; Brooks D. Simpson, 
Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 271.  
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target.5 But this coming campaign would involve no ships 
for the Ninth Corps, only grueling marches and hard 
fighting.  
 As the corps neared Washington City a fourth 
division, consisting entirely of United States Colored 
Troops, was added to the corps. Burnside’s command was 
now composed of close to 21,000 men and 72 cannons 
ready for action.6 Entering the capital, the corps marched 
past throngs of cheering crowds while the divisions’ “soiled 
and tattered flags, bearing inscriptions of battles in six 
states, east and west, were silent and affecting witnesses of 
their valor and their sacrifices.”7 Crossing Long Bridge into 
Virginia, the corps continued its march until, by May 5, 
they were closing in on the Army of the Potomac. As the 
regiments neared the battlefield, one man later wrote, 
“Every soldier knew that we were about to participate in a 
battle, as the booming of cannon and the rattle of musketry 
were heard long before... The trail of the regiments 
preceding us was made plain by the thousands of playing 
cards strewn along the wayside, which they had discarded 
from their blouse pockets to make room for their 
                                                          
5 For the naval expedition, see Marvel, 41-97; for the corps insignia see 
C. McKeever, Civil War Battle flags of the Union Army and Order of 
Battle (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1997 reprint), 81-82.  
6 Darrell L. Collins, Army of the Potomac: Order of Battle, 1861-1865, 
with Commanders, Strengths Losses, and More (Jefferson: McFarland 
& Company, 2013), 168. 
7 Woodbury, 368.  
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testaments, which had reposed unopened, in many cases, 
for weeks, in their knapsacks.”8 
 For Ambrose Burnside, the march to join the Army 
of the Potomac would not have marshaled good memories. 
He had last seen the army after resigning its command 
following the horrific defeat at Fredericksburg in 
December, 1862, followed immediately by the 
embarrassing “Mud March.” As Burnside prepared to leave 
the army in early 1863, he remarked, “Farewell Gentlemen, 
there are no pleasant reminiscences for me connected with 
the Army of the Potomac.”9 For its part, the Army of the 
Potomac was not sorry to see Burnside to go, and blamed 
the side-whiskered general wholeheartedly for its bloody 
defeat. 
 Now, in the spring of 1864, Burnside was returning 
to the Army of the Potomac, and it was already creating 
problems. The most serious matter was that of seniority—
with Burnside’s return he should, by his commission’s date, 
assume command of the Army of the Potomac, taking it 
away from George Meade. Burnside had been 
commissioned a major general of volunteers to date from 
March 18, 1862, while Meade did not attain the same rank 
                                                          
8 Allen D. Albert, editor, History of the Forty-Fifth Regiment 
Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry 1861-1865 (Williamsport, 
PA: Grit Publishing Company, 1912), 114.  
9 A. Wilson Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud” in Gary W. 
Gallagher, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the 
Rappahannock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 
215; Francis A. O’Reilly, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War 
on the Rappahannock (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2003), 495-496.  
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until November 29 of the same year.10 No one expected or 
would have allowed for Burnside to take command of the 
army, and Grant settled on an independent structure for the 
Ninth Corps— Burnside would report directly to Grant and 
get orders from him while the other three infantry corps 
would answer to Meade. It was a clunky system that would 
prove largely ineffective—especially at Spotsylvania, 
whose bloodiest fighting lay just under a week away.11 
 The second problem facing Burnside’s return to the 
Army of the Potomac, even with his independent 
command, was the fact that no one within the army had any 
confidence in him. Though beyond the scope of this 
narrative the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness on 
May 6, 1864 is worth mentioning in passing only because it 
shows the lack of confidence and low expectations that 
army officers had for Burnside. On the Federal left 
Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps crashed through 
the woods and hit elements of A.P. Hill’s Confederates—
some of the same rebels that Burnside would fight at 
Spotsylvania in six days’ time. As Burnside’s corps was 
coming up, his three divisions, led by Thomas Stevenson, 
Robert Potter, and Orlando Willcox, were all ordered 
                                                          
10 George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of Officers and Graduates 
of the U.S. MMilitary Academy , at West Point, N.Y: Volume II (New 
York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868), 191; George W. Cullum, Biographical 
Regster of the Officers and Graduates of the Military Academy at West 
Point, N.Y., Volume I (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868),   
11 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 48. 
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forward.12 But in the thick confines of the Wilderness the 
troops were given unclear directions and “bushwhacked 
toward their indistinct goal,” as one historian writes.13 
Another historian, Gordon C. Rhea, wrote that “For the rest 
of the morning, the [Ninth] Corps remained lost to the 
Federal war effort. Occasionally messages emerged from 
the undergrowth, but the troops themselves seemed to have 
been swallowed up by the Wilderness.”14 
 To the men and officers of the Army of the Potomac 
though, it mattered little that the three divisions got lost. 
What they remembered was the fact that when they needed 
support, Burnside came up short. As Theodore Lyman, aide 
to George Meade, met with Hancock, he reported that 
Burnside was slowly making progress, to which the Second 
Corps commander bellowed, “I knew it…. Just what I 
expected.”15 One of Hancock’s staff officers wrote years 
later that when Burnside did finally get into action, 
“assistance it could hardly be called, for, when Burnside at 
last made his attack, Hancock had already been driven 
back….”16 Charles Wainwright, an artillery officer in the 
Fifth Corps, wrote in his diary, “Burnside somehow is 
                                                          
12 The Fourth Division, commanded by Edward Ferrero, was detached 
and did not take part in the Battle of the Wilderness. See Burnside’s 
report, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the 
War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 906 (hereafter cited as 
OR, followed by part, volume, and page number—all series are 1).  
13 Marvel, Burnside, 355. 
14 Rhea, Wilderness, 331.  
15 Theodore Lyman, Meade’s Headquarters 1863-1865 (Boston: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922), 94. 
16 Francis A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of 
the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886), 427. 
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never up to the mark when the tug comes.” Wainwright 
also commented on Burnside’s subordinate officers, saying, 
“I got a very poor impression of the corps.”17 
 Following the tactical stalemate at the Wilderness, 
which resulted in little other than close to 30,000 casualties, 
Grant decided to shift his forces south, towards 
Spotsylvania Court House. Burnside’s men moved back 
towards Chancellorsville and then began sliding further 
south, reaching the Fredericksburg Road on May 9. This 
road ran straight from Fredericksburg to Grant’s objective 
of Spotsylvania Court House. When Burnside’s men 
reached the road, they now served as the Federals’ left 
flank.18  
 With Orlando Willcox’s division leading the way 
down the Fredericksburg Road, Burnside soon a problem 
that would plague the entire Federal command. Bad maps 
had been distributed before the campaign began and now, 
with Grant trying to issue orders to both Burnside and 
Meade’s Army of the Potomac, the problems associated 
with those maps bubbled to the surface. First was the maps’ 
quality—Theodore Lyman wrote that the maps were 
                                                          
17 Charles W. Wainwright, A Diary of Battle, edited by Allan Nevins 
(Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1998), 352.  
18 On the Wilderness’ casualties, see Noah Andre Trudeau, Bloody 
Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May-June 1864 (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 341; on the movement of the Ninth 
Corps see Burnside’s OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 907-908; Spotsylvania Court 
House serving as Grant’s objective can be found in Gordon C. Rhea, 
The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow 
Tavern: May 7-12, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1997), 13.  
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printed “on wretched spongy paper, which wore out after 
being carried a few days in the pocket….” Furthermore, 
Lyman pointed out that many of the maps had key points 
on them entirely out of position—pertinent to the Battle of 
the Spotsylvania Court House was the fact that the 
courthouse itself was portrayed “two and one half miles to 
the west [from where it is actually located].”19 
 Most problematic to Burnside on May 9 was the 
issue of the location of a “Gate”, as well as the Gayle 
house. This problem would resonate through the next 
couple of days of the battle, culminating with the fighting 
on May 12. Grant issued orders to Burnside, ordering him 
to send “a small force from Gate toward Spotsylvania to 
reconnoiter the roads and enemy’s position in that 
direction, and especially have all roads leading to your 
right… examined… and whether they lead to the positions 
occupied by General Meade’s forces…..”20  In other words, 
Willcox, whose division was leading the corps, was to 
skirmish ahead and see which roads, if any, could link up 
with the Army of the Potomac so that the Federal line could 
be one solid front.  
 There are numerable problems with this order, but 
the main concern is the usage of “Gate.” Going back to the 
horrendous maps, it appears that “Gate” was mentioned on 
both Grant’s and Meade’s maps, but not Burnside’s. The 
choice to write Gate as a proper noun also implies that 
                                                          
19 Theodore Lyman, “Uselessness of Maps,” in The Wilderness 
Campaign May-June 1864, Volume IV (Boston: The Military Historical 
Society of Massachusetts), 79-80.  
20 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 580.  
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Grant and Meade both believed that the Gate was the 
property of a local. There was indeed a gate along the Ninth 
Corps’ advance, but it was just that—a toll gate, not a large 
house, and furthermore, it was far to the rear of Willcox’s 
advance. Nonetheless, Willcox pushed on ahead, towards 
the Gayle house, a structure on the north-eastern side of the 
river. There his skirmishers ran into Confederate pickets of 
infantry and dismounted cavalry and the two sides began to 
open a lively fire. Willcox reported back to Burnside that 
he had “Found the enemy’s vedettes one-half mile before 
reaching Gayle’s house.”21 Reporting back to Grant, 
Burnside reiterated the “Gayle” house. And then, in a snafu 
classic for military history, both Grant and Burnside 
assumed the other was misspelling the g-word—whether it 
was “Gate” or “Gayle” and neither asked for clarification. 
It didn’t help that on the map that Grant possessed, the gate 
was marked where the Gayle house actually stood.22  
 At the end of the day on May 9, Willcox had 
nonetheless pushed across the Ni River and drove away the 
Confederate pickets. From his current position Willcox was 
only about 1.5 miles away from Spotsylvania Court House, 
and ahead of him lay just more Confederate pickets—had 
the Third Division pressed down the road, the likelihood of 
capturing the courthouse and its vital crossroads was very 
                                                          
21 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 581; for detailed topographic maps of the 
Spotsylvania area, see map series “Battle of Spotsylvania Court 
House”, produced by Steven Stanley, 2000. 
22 William D. Matter, If It Takes All Summer: The Battle of 
Spotsylvania (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 
110.  
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high. The Federal high command’s faulty cartography 
depicted the distance between the Ni River crossing and 
Spotsylvania as 3.5 miles, however. Gordon C. Rhea 
summarizes this whole episode as “Burnside missed a 
superb opportunity.”23 Later that night Burnside finally 
tried to clear up the confusion, writing, “The position 
occupied by General Willcox is at Mr. Gayle’s house, there 
being no such place as Gate in this section….”24 The note 
apparently did not stick; in his postwar history of the 
campaign, Meade’s chief of staff Andrew Humphreys 
wrote that “General Burnside moved with the Ninth 
Corps… to Gate’s house, on the road from [Spotsylvania] 
Court House to Fredericksburg, and then toward the Court 
House, crossing the [Ni] at Gate’s house (a mile and a half 
from the Court House)….” 25  At least by the 1880s 
Humphreys had learned the true distance from the river to 
Spotsylvania.  
 If May 9 had been difficult for Burnside in trying to 
get through the ambiguous orders, May 10 was difficult 
because Burnside lost his “ablest division commander.”26 
Brigadier General Thomas Stevenson brought his First 
Division forward to support Willcox’s command in 
solidifying their front on the southern side of the Ni River. 
Seeking some shade (the mercury recorded 89 degrees at 2 
                                                          
23 Matter, 110; Rhea, Spotsylvania, 103.  
24 Burnside to Grant, OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 583. 
25 Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864-1865 (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 72.  
26 Rhea, Spotsylvania, 182. 
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PM in Washington City—65 miles north),27 Stevenson 
lounged about and smoked cigars with his staff. Then, 
breaking the brief reprieve in an extremely bloody fashion, 
a bullet cracked through the back of Stevenson’s head, 
toppling him over. The twenty-eight year old Brigadier 
General was dead almost instantly. Burnside wrote that 
Stevenson’s death was a “severe misfortune” and that the 
general had “on all occasions proved himself an efficient 
soldier.”28 As Stevenson’s body was sent back to Boston, 
Colonel Daniel Leasure took over command of the First 
Division. One of his new staff officers wrote, “I had a 
favorable opinion of him, but I can’t say I retain it.”29 Over 
the course of the next day Burnside was hesitant to further 
use the division under Leasure. 
 By May 10, the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House 
was into its third day. By this point of the battle 
Confederate engineers had laid out their defensive works—
the most famous being the Mule Shoe Salient. Measuring 
“1,800 yards wide at the base and 1,320 yards deep from 
the base to the tip”,30 the Mule Shoe was truly massive and 
also proved to be a liability for its Confederate defenders; a 
salient can be attacked from three sides at once, making it 
                                                          
27 Robert K. Krick, Civil War Weather in Virginia (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2007), 129. 
28 Derek Smith, The Gallant Dead: Union and Confederate Generals 
Killed in the Civil War (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2005), 230; 
Burnside’s OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 908-909.  
29 Marvel, Burnside, 360.  
30 Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field 
Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007), 47. 
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difficult to defend. As Lee’s line continued, the 
Confederate engineers followed the natural contour lines of 
the ridge they were on and dug a second salient, this one “a 
minor protrusion in comparison [to the Mule Shoe]… The 
trench was over five feet deep, and pine logs topped the 
parapet.”31 This second salient would be guarded mostly by 
men of Henry Heth’s division, thus the position got its 
name—Heth’s Salient. These works would soon become 
the focus of major Federal attacks. 
 There was little fighting on Burnside’s front on May 
11, but plenty of maneuvering. As Grant planned his big 
offensive against Lee’s line for the next day, the Ninth 
Corps spent the majority of the day re-crossing the Ni River 
back to the north side. In the midst of driving rain storms, 
this proved difficult to do. Once the high command realized 
what was going on, the corps was ordered to re-cross the 
river again and regain their works on the south side of the 
river. The end result was that the Ninth Corps spent the 
majority of May 11 in the rain marching back and forth 
only to end up in the exact same place as they had started, 
only now exhausted and soaked to the bone. Burnside 
denied ordering the move, as did Grant—historian William 
Matter writes that “Until more evidence is uncovered, this 
episode will remain a mystery.”32  
 In the meantime, the soldiers of the Ninth Corps 
suffered for the lack of shelter. One solder in the 57th 
Massachusetts wrote, “The afternoon of the 11th [of May] 
                                                          
31 Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee, 58-59. 
32 Matter, If it Takes All Summer, 174.  
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was rainy, which continued through the night. The Fifty-
Seventh rested upon their arms without shelter of any kind, 
the ground was wet and the men’s clothing also, with no 
opportunity of getting dry; sleep was impossible….”33 
Another soldier in the 7th Rhode Island added, “The rain 
poured in torrents over the hundreds lying around. Few had 
blankets.”34 For all of their marches, the soldiers did not 
reach their trenches until about 10:00 PM, which meant 
they had about six hours to lie around in the mud until 
going forward.35  
 While the Ninth Corps moved about and struggled 
with the elements, Burnside got his orders for the next 
day’s attack. Grant’s message to Burnside was time-
stamped at 4:00 PM, but the latter probably did not get the 
order “until near dark”—sunset on May 11 was three 
minutes shy of 7:00 PM.36 In his orders, Grant wrote that 
“You will move against the enemy with your entire force 
promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o’clock 
to-morrow morning. Let your preparations for this attack be 
conducted with the utmost secrecy, and veiled entirely from 
the enemy.”37 To assist Burnside, Grant ordered two of his 
                                                          
33 John Anderson, The Fifty-Seventh Regiment of Massachusetts 
Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion (Boston: E.B. Stillings & Co., 
1896), 80. 
34 William Palmer Hopkins, The Seventh Regiment Rhode Island 
Volunteers in the Civil War, 1862-1865 (Boston: Hub Engraving Co., 
1903), 169.  
35 Rhea, Spotsylvania, 218.  
36 Marvel, Burnside, 362, Krick, Civil War in Virginia, 129.  
37 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 643.  
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aides, Cyrus Comstock and Orville Babcock, to attach 
themselves to the Ninth Corps staff and direct the attacks.  
 After getting his orders Burnside began to plan his 
corps’ attacks. Some have criticized Burnside for his lack 
of overall preparations in these stages of the battle—one 
historian writes that he was “befuddled” and “dithered” in 
front of the enemy on May 10, and he characterized 
Burnside’s fighting on May 12 as “a spectacle of 
embarrassing confusion.”38 Ambrose Burnside serves as an 
easy target for these historians as the debacle at 
Fredericksburg will always stain his name, but it is unfair 
to claim that Burnside did nothing but spew incompetence; 
in the midst of the Ninth Corps’ preparations on the night 
of May 11 it is important to remember Grant’s warning to 
keep the movements an “utmost secrecy, and veiled 
entirely from the enemy,” a line that his two aides also 
reiterated.39 In this setting, it is easy to understand why 
Burnside was hesitant to send scouts forward to reconnoiter 
the ground, especially when Comstock, one of the aides 
from Grant, had already done so earlier in the day, could 
provide Burnside with whatever directions the he needed. 
Furthermore, after arriving at Burnside’s headquarters in 
the dark, “Comstock suggested no reconnaissance.”40 
                                                          
38 John Cannan, Spotsylvania Campaign: May 7-21 (Conshohocken: 
Combined Books, 1997), 98; John Cannan, Bloody Angle: Hancock’s 
Assault on the Mule Shoe Salient May 12, 1864 (Cambridge: Da Capo 
Press, 2002), 135.  
39 See Note 37. 
40 Comstock’s reconnaissance is found in Rhea, Spotsylvania, 215; 
Marvel, Burnside, 362. 
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 In the midst of all this, another curveball was 
thrown at Burnside when Major General Thomas L. 
Crittenden arrived and took over command of the corps’ 
First Division.41 Crittenden was another general whose 
presence threatened to upend the army’s hierarchy; his 
major general’s commission dated from July 17, 1862, four 
months before George Meade.42 By assigning Crittenden to 
the independent Ninth Corps, the matter of commissions 
were avoided, but Crittenden had other baggage he brought 
along. In the Chickamauga Campaign in the early fall of 
1863 Crittenden had commanded the Army of the 
Cumberland’s Twenty-First Corps, totaling almost 11,000 
infantrymen.43 With his defeat at Chickamauga, William S. 
Rosecrans looked for scapegoats, and one of those men was 
Crittenden. In late January of 1864, a court of inquiry was 
established to “investigate the conduct of” three generals, 
including Crittenden.44 Over the next twenty-one days the 
court heard testimony and examined the Battle of 
Chickamauga in detail before it absolved Crittenden and 
wrote, “The evidence… respecting General Crittenden’s 
operations… not only shows no cause for censure, but, on 
the contrary, that his whole conduct was most 
creditable….”45 Though absolved, the court was still a stain 
                                                          
41 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 909.  
42 Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 100. 
43 Crittenden’s force is tallied up from figures compiled in David A. 
Powell, The Chickamauga Campaign: August 22-September 19, 1863 
(El Dorao Hills: Savas Beatie, 2014),  639-641.  
44 OR, Vol. 30, pt. 1, 930.  
45 Ibid., 996.  
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on Crittenden, and whereas he had commanded close to 
11,000 troops at Chickamauga, his First Division command 
in the Ninth Corps now only tallied about 2,100.46 
 With poor maps, a tired and soaked corps, and a 
new division commander with only a couple of hours’ 
experience in command, Ambrose Burnside prepared his 
attack in the early morning hours of Thursday, May 12, 
1864. According to orders, Robert Potter’s Second Division 
left their works around four in the morning and began to 
slide north, looking to link up with Hancock’s Second 
Corps. By punctually ordering Potter’s division up, Gordon 
C. Rhea says Burnside was “displaying unaccustomed 
vigor”, but Burnside biographer William Marvel would 
disagree with this assessment, writing “Burnside had never 
had much trouble holding up his end of a schedule 
before[.]”47 Either way, Potter’s force of about 5,700 men 
crashed through the woods and struck the eastern salient of 
the Mule Shoe just minutes after Hancock’s men had 
completely shattered the top of it.48 The Confederate 
defenders of the tip of the salient were almost all captured 
en masse, leaving Hancock’s men with some 2,700 
prisoners to take care of.49 However, the success also came 
                                                          
46 Troop strength comes from Collins’ strength of First Division before 
the Wilderness, 168, and subtracting 535 casualties, as evidenced in 
OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 131. This figure does not account for any casualties 
the First Division would have suffered on May 10 or 11 due to 
skirmishing.  
47 Rhea, Spotsylvania, 244; Marvel, Burnside, 473 (n. 25). 
48 Potter’s strength, Collins, 168. 
49 Alfred C. Young III, Lee’s Army during the Overland Campaign: A 
Numerical Study (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2013), 236 
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with problems. An officer in Hancock’s corps wrote that, 
“All line and formation was now lost…Amid the wild 
confusion of the glorious success, it was difficult to 
preserve order.”50 In this confused melee, Potter’s three 
brigades hit below Hancock and got some of their own 
spoils, including two captured cannon.51 
 The confusion of the Federal breakthrough assisted 
the Confederate response immensely. Gathering his brigade 
of almost 2,000 North Carolinians, James Lane pushed up 
to the edge of the salient. As other Confederate brigades, 
mostly from Ewell’s Second Corps, were hitting Hancock, 
Lane focused his attention on Potter’s men. His five 
regiments in tow, Lane moved forward and later wrote, “In 
the best of spirits the brigade welcomed the furious assault, 
which soon followed, with prolonged cheers and death 
dealing volleys[.]”52 
 Lane’s men were soon joined by the combined 
weight of the 2,500 men present in Alfred Scales’ and 
Edward Thomas’ brigades.  The three Confederate brigades 
soon proved too much for Potter’s men and the Federals 
gave ground, even giving up the two cannon they had 
captured earlier. Potter wrote in his report, “The connection 
on our right with the Second Corps being broken… we 
were forced out of the enemy’s work with a few prisoners.” 
                                                          
50 St. Clair A. Mulholland, The Story Of The 116th Regiment 
Pennsylvania Volunteers In the War of the Rebellion (Philadelphia: F. 
McManus, Jr & Co., 1903), 209. 
51 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 928. 
52Young, 246; Lane’s Report in Southern Historical Society Papers: 
Volume 9, 146.  
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By 8:00 AM Potter’s men were out of their breach and 
spent the rest of the day trading shots with the rebels to 
their immediate front as well as small sorties against the 
rebel works which accomplished little.53 
 As Burnside tried to get a handle on the fighting to 
his front, Grant pushed him to send more troops in. 
Increasingly frustrated at his commander’s impatience, 
Burnside crumpled up and threw on the ground one 
dispatch and, at another demand, verbally snapped at 
Comstock. The firing continued at its heaviest near the 
western salient of the Mule Shoe, which would soon get its 
infamous name of the Bloody Angle. Hoping to help, 
Burnside ordered more attacks, this time not at the eastern 
salient, but at the rebel positions further south—at Heth’s 
Salient.54  
 Thomas Crittenden’s First Division was picked for 
this task, and its two brigades began to advance through the 
swampy ravines and bottomlands, crashing through the 
woods closer and closer to Heth’s line. But with 
Crittenden’s newness to the division, combind with the two 
brigades’ near-total exhaustion, the fighting formation did 
not make it far. As the Federals stumbled towards Heth’s 
Salient, the Confederates behind their works readied their 
rifles. The rebels in these works belonged to the two 
brigades of Joseph Davis and Robert Mayo, who together 
had about 2,300 men. As soon as Crittenden’s men came 
                                                          
53 Combined strength of Scales and Thomas, Young, 246; Potter’s 
report, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 928; Steven Stanley Map Series, “Battle of 
Spotsylvania Court House”, Map 12 of 24.  
54 Marvel, Burnside, 364.  
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into view, the two brigades opened fire. Heth, who 
ironically had been roommates with Burnside at West 
Point, wrote, “[Crittenden’s] attack was met with firmness 
and repelled with gallantry. The enemy left many dead and 
wounded in our front. A stand of colors was captured 
during this affair….”55 Adding to his rather stoic report, 
Heth allowed himself some more prose in his memoirs, 
where he added, “On the [12th] of May my breastworks 
[were] vigorously assailed by General Burnside… the 
attacking force, or some of them, came within thirty paces 
of my breastworks; at the same time my infantry poured a 
shower of lead into Burnside’s troops. They were exposed 
to a raking fire of my artillery on my right, where I had 
some twenty pieces in position.”56 
 Crittenden’s repulse left Burnside with only 
Orlando Willcox’s division. The corps’ Third Division 
moved off towards the salient, hoping to break through in 
one-last attempt. With the fighting at the Bloody Angle 
having descended into a maddened killing spree of little 
overall importance, Burnside’s ultimate objective was to 
break through Heth’s Salient, forcing Lee to move men 
away from the Mule Shoe, potentially opening the door to a 
final Federal success. Willcox’s two brigades moved off in 
the same fashion as Crittenden, whose disjointed fragments 
also tried to join the attack. Joining the infantry were four 
                                                          
55 Henry Heth, Heth’s Report of Spring 1864 to October 1864, 
unpublished, Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania National Military Park 
archives; Henry Heth Memoirs Henry Heth, edited by James L. 
Morrison (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), 185-186.  
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batteries of guns under the Ninth Corps Chief of Artillery, 
Lieutenant Samuel Benjamin.57 As Willcox’s two brigades, 
under John Hartranft and Benjamin Christ, advanced they 
soon came under the same fire that had met Crittenden’s 
division, together with an added thrust—a Confederate 
counter-attack of two brigades, centered against Willcox’s 
left and aimed straight at the four batteries of artillery. 
 Looking to do the exact same thing as Grant, but in 
reverse, Robert E. Lee looked to take pressure off the Mule 
Shoe, and saw the easiest way to do so would be to hit the 
Federal left—Burnside’s corps. Willcox’s attack was timed 
almost perfectly to the same moment that the Confederate 
attack struck out from the right flank of Heth’s Salient. The 
two brigades belonged to David Weisiger and James Lane, 
the latter having already repulsed Robert Potter earlier in 
the morning. As Lane’s men led the attack, though, they 
“commenced yelling too soon and drew upon themselves a 
terrible fire of canister from four of the guns…”58 
 The fighting around Benjamin’s batteries descended 
into chaos. Willcox wrote in his diary, “At one time the 
enemy was within ten paces, but the 2nd Michigan, 
supporting this battery, re-manned the guns and with the 
aid of canister of the other batteries, repulsed the charge 
splendidly.”59 While the fighting swirled about the 
batteries, the musketry from within Heth’s Salient 
                                                          
57 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 941.  
58 Southern Historical Society Papers: Volume 9, 148.  
59 Orlando B. Willcox, Forgotten Valor: The Memoirs, Journals, & 
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continued to hit Willcox’s brigades from the front, and 
Willcox noted that “my front line suffered severely in 
killed, wounded, and prisoners….”60 Especially caught in 
the middle, not only by the fire to their front, but also by 
Weisiger’s and Lane’s counter-attack, the 17th Michigan 
nearly ceased to exist—“only four dozen men escaped.”61 
Though it was able to repulse Weisiger and Lane, 
Willcox’s division’s attack was spent before it really got a 
chance to get underway. The attack slunk back to its 
defensive works, ending, for all practical purposes, the 
fighting around Heth’s Salient on May 12.  
 So ended Ambrose Burnside’s attacks on May 12 at 
Spotsylvania. Strategically, why were they important? In 
his memoirs, Grant perhaps expressed it best when he 
wrote, “Burnside accomplished but little of a positive 
nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from 
reinforcing his [center] from that quarter.”62 In other words, 
Burnside’s attacks kept portions of three Confederate 
divisions (Heth, Cadmus Wilcox, and William Mahone) 
away from the Mule Shoe—troops that could have been 
used to tip the balance and completely evict the Federal 
breakthrough. Others, however, were not so willing to see 
what Burnside had accomplished. Only knowing that 
Burnside failed to break Heth’s line, a staff officer in the 
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Sixth Corps wrote that Burnside was a “[damned] 
humbug.”63 
 It is difficult to get an understanding of the casualty 
counts for the Ninth Corps as well as the Confederates from 
the fighting near Heth’s Salient. In his report, Burnside 
claimed that the corps had lost 1,500 killed, wounded, and 
captured, but that figure also included losses in the days 
following May 12. Confederate counts encompass the 
entirety of the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, which 
for Henry Heth, meant stand-up fights against the Second 
Corps in the days before fighting against Burnside. For the 
entire battle, Heth’s division suffered 350 casualties, while 
Lane’s brigade, which seemed to be everywhere on May 
12, claimed 470 casualties for the day.64  
 Had Burnside broken through at Heth’s Salient, it 
would have broken open Lee’s line. After the collapse of 
the Mule Shoe, Lee had his engineers, joined by soldiers 
who were routed from the initial clash there work 
feverishly on a fallback line, digging into the wet earth with 
“pick and shovel.”65 However, that fallback line ran along 
with, and incorporated Heth’s Salient. Had any of 
Burnside’s attacks broken through, the entirety of the new 
line would be useless as the Ninth Corps came crashing 
down onto the unfinished trench system. From there, Lee’s 
                                                          
63 Oliver Wenndell Holmes, Jr, Touched with Fire: Civil War Letters 
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De Wolfe Howe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), 116. 
64 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 911; Young, Lee’s Army, 246; Southern 
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options and his defensive nature against Grant would have 
been severely limited. 
 But Burnside did not break through. He did not 
break through because of the actions of the Confederates at 
Heth’s Salient, who held steady in the face of three separate 
attacks, and even managed their own attack that sent 
Willcox’s division sprawling back in confusion. Any 
discussion of what might have been beyond this is mere 
conjecture and opinion. For all the damage done, the 
bloodletting was not over. The armies would move steadily 
south, all the way to Petersburg, where a mine, an 
explosion, and a bloody crater waited for Major General 
Ambrose Burnside. 
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